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Abstract: This article explores the abolition in 1846 of the deodand – the object or animal 
declared responsible for death by an inquest jury – and its relationship with the family of 
the deceased.  Drawing on the work of Jacques Donzelot, it argues that the deodand 
brought contingency into the heart of law, and that its replacement with a legal right to 
compensation for dependents was a move to rationalise the investigation of death.  This 
rationalisation had consequences; limiting the place of the unruly community, centring and 
regulated the family, and disconnecting the inquest from the material of death.   
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“And nothing may we use in vain; 
Even beasts must be with justice slain, 
Else men are made their deodands. 
Though they should wash their guilty hands  
In this warm life-blood which doth part 
From thine, and wound me to the heart,            
Yet could they not be clean; their stain 
Is dyed in such a purple grain. 
There is not such another in 
The world, to offer for their sin” 
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Andrew Marvell, ‘The Nymph Complaining for the Death of her Fawn’ c.1650 
 
Introduction 
For centuries in England and Wales, at the end of in an inquest into a death, the jury could 
declare an animal or inanimate object to be responsible for the death.  Such an object was 
named deodand, a gift to God (1), and was forfeit to the Sovereign.  Abolished by statute in 
1846, the demise of the deodand coincided with Parliament’s approval of Lord Campbell’s 
Act of the same year, which permitted relatives of the deceased to claim damages arising 
out of the death.  Prior to this, any possible claim for negligence ended with the death of the 
injured party. 
Recent academic engagement has focussed on the deodand as an example of the role non-
human actants can play in law, troubling the distinction between human and object/animal 
(2) – an endeavour which can be traced back through Marvell’s Nymph, and the 
transformation of ‘ungentle men’ into deodands through unjust slaying of an animal.  This 
article builds on these insights, and focuses on the moment of abolition of the deodand to 
draw out the subversive possibilities of the deodand.  I explore the ways in which the 
deodand brought contingency and materiality into the law, and argue that in exchanging the 
deodand for a claim, the law promised to contain risk, which the deodand had previously 
demonstrated was everywhere and in everything.   However, this promise to replace risk 
with certainty with the imposition of a familial compensation claim – constructed as rational 
and progressive – brought a new kind of arbitrariness into the law.   
I argue that this replacement of the deodand with a familial claim to compensation makes 
an account of the place of the family a crucial part of any discussion of the deodand.  This 
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work is part of a broader project in which I trace the family in the contemporary inquest, 
and, drawing on Donzelot’s thesis (3) that the family is critical in the emergence of liberal 
governmentalities, I argue that this is a transformational moment in that account.  Prior to 
this, the family had no special place in the law, and the legislative swap of the deodand for 
the claim was a key step in carving out a distinct place for them in the inquest jurisdiction.   
The article is in four parts.  In the first part I briefly discuss the deodand itself and describe 
the relationship between the deodand and the family in the historic inquest.  Thereafter, 
adopting Donzelot’s methodology of exploring history through tracing the lines of 
transformation which reshape the social surface, I analyse three lines of transformation, 
starting with the technical legal change from deodand to cause of action by the family.  My 
second line of transformation analyses the shift from community to family; exploring public 
order and the inquest as a popular court.  Finally, I examine mutations in the ritual of the 
inquest, the promise to control risk, and the decline of materiality.   
The Deodand – flexible, contingent and anti-modern 
In London, in late August in the mid-thirteenth century, a jury gathered on a Monday 
morning to consider the death of William Bonefaunt.  They concluded that “on the 
preceding Sunday, at the hour of curfew, the above William, had stood drunk, naked and 
alone, on the top of a stair in the aforesaid rent for the purpose of relieving nature when by 
accident he fell head foremost to the ground and forthwith died.  The stair appraised at 6d 
for which William De Brykelworth, one of the Sheriffs, will answer.”(4) 
The stair from which William fell was a deodand, and the value of it was forfeit.   “Any 
moveable thing not fixed to the freehold, or instrument inanimate or beast animate” (5) 
5 
 
could be a deodand, and William Bonefaunt’s step illustrates the deodand in all of its elusive 
ambiguity. 
Its defining feature is a lack of definition.  The decision to name an object deodand was at 
the discretion of the jury (although the attitude of the coroner was inevitably relevant (6)) 
and it was for the jury to assign a value to it (7).  Crucially, the deodand was an inherently 
contingent object; a chattel which through the jury’s shaping of the narratives of death 
became linked to that death.  The variability of the deodand’s appearance in the law and the 
historical record mean that few irrefutable assertions can be made about it, and like the 
office of the coroner itself (7), its origins predate legislative attention.  The earliest official 
mention of the deodand is found in the reign of Edward I, in De Officio Coronatoris in 1275-
76, which includes no definition and which clearly draws on pre-existing common law (9).  
The deodand did not appear again in statute until 1833 (10), but was considered judicially 
and, probably most influentially, in the work of a handful of key jurists, including Fleta, 
Britton, Coke, Hale and Blackstone.  
Unfortunately, in their attempts to set out the law – a task which, speaking about his wider 
project, Coke describes as “a worke arduous, and full of such difficultie, as none can either 
feele or beleeve, but he onely which maketh tryall of it” (11) – they only succeeded in 
creating more mystery and confusion over the meaning and purpose of the deodand (12).  
In fact, as Pervukhin (13) convincingly shows, the creation of deodand law was driven by 
juries, and many of the rules around deodand were created as jurists and courts sought to 
make sense of the wide variation in jury decisions on deodand.  Few inquest jury decisions 
were appealed for the courts to develop common law principles, and while jurists sought to 
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impose clear principles on deodand law, there is little evidence to suggest that juries 
considered themselves bound by these principles.   
This is not to suggest that coroners and juries entirely ignored these rules.  For example, 
courts emphasised the role of movement, and juries often suggested movement (14) was 
important, as with Elyas Ide, seaman, who fell from a mast and “immediately” died.  The 
jury “attribute his death solely to his drunkenness and the rope, and further find that 
neither the ship nor anything belonging to it was moving or being moved except the rope, 
which they appraise at 10s.” (15) However, as court decisions acknowledged, movement 
was only one factor (16), and other jury considerations in finding and valuing a deodand 
seem to have included mischief, negligence, retribution, and proximity (17).  Juries 
manipulated items said to have caused death – and the values of those objects – and 
“tailored their findings to each individual case.” (18) 
It is otherwise difficult to understand the deodand of a ladder in the case of William le 
Cupere of Bedford (19).  The jury concluded that on 18 August 1272 he had “climbed up 
Cauldwell church … to do his work.  He saw 2 pigeons in the belfry, climbed up inside it to 
look for them, and by misadventure fell through the middle of an opening (clera), breaking 
his right leg and the whole of his body.”  He died the following day, and the ladder he had 
climbed up to get into the belfry was appraised at 6d and declared deodand.  Suggestively, 
the report also states that the prior of Cauldwell was fined for taking it without warrant, and 
although no explicit link is made between the prior’s behaviour in taking the ladder and the 
declaration of deodand, it is clear that in some way the jury linked William’s death to the 
prior, perhaps as an informal health and safety punishment.  From our perspective, the 
ladder might be seen as peripheral; having used it to enter the belfry, the inquisition 
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suggests it played no part in his subsequent fall.  Declaring the ladder to be deodand, 
therefore supposedly – by one definition (20) – the immediate cause of his death, serves to 
highlight the deodand’s flexibility.   
The abolition of the jury’s power to manipulate the deodand in 1846 is part of a wider 
context in which the institution of the inquest engaged with conceptions of modernity 
during the 19th century.  There was a productive tension between the professionalised 
inquest, which was a site for medical and public health intervention, and the inquest as a 
public forum for protection of individual liberty (21).  The deodand failed to fit these 
narratives, and its abolition was one step within a broader pattern of cultural, political and 
legislative reformulations.  These latter included endeavours to rationalise and standardise 
the office of coroner, to deal with corruption, and to abolish elections for coroners; as well 
as a shift from common law to statute when the office of coroner was reconstituted in 
legislation in 1887; and the later removal of the need for the jury to view the body in 1926. 
(22)  
This modernisation of the coroner’s inquest meant that by the early twentieth century the 
inquest had been significantly reworked: pulled out of the public house, “where the majesty 
of death evaporated with the fumes from the gin of the jury,” (23) and (re)invested with its 
“modern [focus of] an investigation into the cause and circumstances of death.” (24)      
The Deodand as Financial Relief 
One aspect of the flexibility of the deodand is that, although theoretically forfeit to the 
Sovereign, it was sometimes used as a mechanism to provide financial support to those 
bereaved by the death.  In 1837, Robert Cocking, a stuntman in Vauxhall Gardens, died 
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when his parachute failed to open.  Following the inquest, the parachute was declared 
deodand and was given to the Treasury.  A fund to support his widow applied for the 
parachute, and this was granted (25).   Similarly, in 1825 in London, deodands of £50 on a 
coach and horses and £10 on a cask of ginger were granted to the widows of deceased men 
(26).  The coach and horses had run over and killed a hairdresser, while the cask of ginger 
was being carried by a labourer when he fell down a hole and died. 
Primary sources do not generally tell us what happened to the object, and sources differ 
over whether as a matter of law the owner of the deodand could choose to forfeit the 
object which would then be sold, or pay the valuation by the jury, or if it was not open to 
them to choose.  Where the object was forfeit itself, it is unclear what role the jury’s 
valuation played, but it is clear that in some instances, as with Robert Cocking’s parachute, 
the object itself was given up.  In many sources, there is slippage between deodand as an 
object and deodand as a sum of money amounting to a valuation of an object, as with the 
debates in Parliament at the point of abolition, where the Attorney-General referred to the 
new system as “making the deodand recoverable by an action at civil law.” (27)   
The Sheriff, or other local official, is often stated to be responsible for the deodand, and 
may have been able to collect the value from the local community (28), and there are 
examples of a deodand being awarded but not subsequently collected from the owner (29).  
As with the definition of the deodand, the sources suggest a great deal of variability in 
practice, and also in valuation, with at least one suggestion that where the Lord of the 
Manor publicly declared the deodand would be given to the deceased’s family, this 
encouraged higher awards. (30) 
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However, it is not easy to establish how often the deodand was used to provide some 
financial support for the bereaved, as the ultimate destination of the deodand is not 
generally included in the coroner’s rolls which are the main source of evidence.  One 
support for it as a practice might be found in the rule which states that no deodand will be 
declared in non-moving cases where the victim was under 14.  Pervukin argues that this rule 
appears to have been inadvertently invented by Staunford based on coroner’s rolls and jury 
decisions but without firm judicial authority (31).  She contends that it is likely that the rule 
arose because most children would be killed at home, and it was unlikely that juries would 
want to punish grieving parents.  Another possibly complementary explanation is that if the 
deodand was regularly granted to the bereaved, there would be little need for a deodand 
for the death of a child at home, because the parents would both own the deodand already 
and be the beneficiaries of a declaration of deodand by the jury.  While this is speculation, 
there is substantial support in the secondary materials for the deodand playing a role in 
providing financial relief for the bereaved (32).   
The historical origins of this practice are contested.  Links to the deodand have been drawn 
(and disputed) with Biblical law, Roman and Greek law as well as the Anglo-Saxon concept 
of the ‘bane’ whereby family members of those slain would receive payment from the slayer 
to avert vengeance (33).  MacCormack argues that a definite conclusion cannot be reached 
(34), while Sutton considers that “It is quite possible that the deodand was at first a form of 
compensation which gradually developed into pure forfeiture.” (35) 
The traditional narrative in relation to deodands is that they peaked in use in the 13th-14th 
Centuries and gradually disappeared during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, before 
reappearing with the railway age, when some significant deodand awards were made (36).  
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Some near-contemporary sources support this analysis (37).  However, Sutton has identified 
“extensive and valuable deodands” in Holderness in Yorkshire in the 18th Century, as well as 
examples in Marlborough and Westminster (38), and Pervukin suggests that the deodand 
might have continued to be levied, but had slipped out of official attention (39).  The 
presence of the deodand in Marvell’s Nymph could also be counted as supportive evidence 
for awareness of, and therefore some possible use of, the deodand in the 17th Century.   
From Financial Relief to Cause of Action 
Crucially, by the time the deodand came to be abolished, its abolition was mirrored by the 
introduction of a right for the dependent family to claim compensation, reinforcing the link 
between the bereaved family and the deodand.  This technical legal line of transformation, 
from a discretionary decision by the inquest jury, to a claim outside the inquest, is explored 
in three short sections; I outline the deodand’s role in financial relief for the bereaved, then 
I discuss the debates in Parliament, and finally I assess the replacement - the family’s right 
to bring a claim. 
Discretionary relief 
A crucial plank in the argument against the deodand as a compensatory tool was that it was 
based in the “defective machinery of a coroner’s court”, in the arbitrary exercise of 
discretion by the inquest jury (40).  From the perspective of the dependent bereaved and 
the need to replace lost income from the death of a family member, the wide scope granted 
to the jury in relation to both the award of a deodand and the valuation of the item 
doubtless carried risk.  There was little guarantee that if any relief was awarded it would 
cover the loss, and there was a risk that the jury would award no deodand at all.  Smith 
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argues that juries may have declined to award significant deodands because of the stigma 
attached to such awards, and inquest juries might have objected to mistreating otherwise 
responsible citizens by taking away their property or fining them (41).  In 1845 H.B., albeit in 
an article seeking to juxtapose the unreasonable use of deodands in the 1840s with previous 
decisions, describes it as being “clear from the ancient authorities, that jurors always 
determined the amount of deodand to be imposed with great moderation, and with due 
regard to the rights of property and the moral innocence of the party incurring the penalty.” 
(42) 
There was also the risk that large deodands could be struck down by the court, leaving 
families with nothing (43). In 1842, a decision of Lord Denman nullifying an £800 deodand 
was “an example of the venom which coroner’s courts could excite among high court 
judges” (44) and there were a sequence of cases in the early 1840s in which the Queen’s 
Bench deployed a variety of technical arguments to invalidate large deodands (45) (although 
not all appeals by owners of deodands were successful (46)). 
It was not only the jury that exercised a discretion in relation to the deodand.  Once 
declared, the deodand was forfeit to the Crown or to whomsoever the Crown had granted 
the right - a local landowner or a local institution.  Thus, for a bereaved family to receive 
financial relief, a second hurdle sometimes needed to be crossed; as with friends and 
relatives of the nine individuals who died in the Sonning railway crash on Christmas Eve 
1841.  Despite the reluctance of the Coroner, the jury levied a £1000 deodand, attaching 
“great blame” to the company for placing passenger coaches (filled with 3rd class 
passengers) close to the engine, so that the heavy goods which formed most of the train 
crushed their coaches when the train hit a landslide.  Subsequently, The Times reported that 
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friends of the nine deceased would get £100 each.  It seems that Mr Palmer, the local lord of 
the manor, received petitions from these friends based on the article in the Times, as he 
then wrote to the paper to state it was questionable whether a deodand would belong to 
him, and in any case it was too early to say how the money would be distributed.  Sutton 
notes from the accounts of Great Western that there was indeed no apparent subsequent 
payment to Mr Palmer, but the company did pay out money for hospital bills for those 
injured (47).  
A possible response to both the risk of having a deodand struck down and the family not 
receiving compensation, was for a jury to threaten a deodand, and thereby to negotiate a 
solution with the deodand owner.  In one example of this, in 1833, the jury apparently 
extracted financial support for the widow of John Skinner from the ship-owner Mr Mellish 
by threatening a deodand (48).   
Thus the deodand could be deployed as a tool to give money to the family, either through a 
direct grant or through indirect means by jury negotiation, but the bereaved could not 
oblige the coroner, jury or state to provide them with financial relief.  Smith, reviewing 
these developments, suggests that the deodand was moving towards a system of 
compensation “although at a painfully slow rate and in an incredibly haphazard fashion.” 
(49)   
Passage of the Bills 
In direct contradiction to this, in the Lords debate on abolition, Lord Campbell asserted that 
under the deodand, relatives could receive no compensation, whatever the degree of 
negligence (50).  Lord Campbell’s critique focussed on the incoherence of a law which 
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compensated where injury was short of death, but where death ensued, as well as the 
deodand’s consequent failure to deter poor practice leading to deaths (51).  
In the other House, Thomas Wakley, prominent radical MP and “one of the most fearless, 
capable and sympathetic Coroners who ever served the public” (52) set out an alternative 
account of why the deodand “ought not to remain in its present state.” (53)  He cited an 
example of a fatal accident which was caused by a railway employee previously found to be 
guilty of very gross offences but nevertheless retained by the company. The jury had 
imposed a deodand of £2,000.  As coroner, Wakley was concerned that “if it was tried in a 
court of law, the inquisition was not very likely to stand.”  He therefore consulted the 
Attorney-General (54) and leading Counsel (55) and was advised that the result would 
withstand the scrutiny of the Queen’s Bench.  Having satisfied himself, 
“He said to himself ‘Well, it is now clear that for their gross misconduct the company 
will have to pay 2,000l.’ He was however sadly disappointed by the result.  The case 
was taken by the defendants into the Court of Queen’s Bench, where the inquisition 
was at once declared to be utterly worthless – it was cast aside and treated as 
almost worse than waste paper.  He believed that no inquisition had ever been 
drawn with so much care and attention as that to which he was referring; and he 
thought it was quite clear, from the result, that the law ought not to continue in its 
present state.” (56) 
For Wakley, the problem with the deodand was the inconsistency of its application, which 
gave a reactive and conservative Queens Bench the opportunity to defeat just punishments 
with legal technicality (57).  Wakley, medically qualified and the founder of The Lancet, was 
eager to use the position of coroner to promote public health, and had found “no benefit 
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whatsoever to arise from the present law of deodands” (58) because it failed as an effective 
tool he could use to force change (59).  Instead of reinforcing a rational investigation 
dedicated to preventing future deaths, the deodand permitted the jury a wide rein at the 
end of the hearing; granting them the ability to declare a deodand against a gentleman’s 
horse, when his servant may have been to blame for the death; failing to punish a livery 
stable keeper who lent a drunken apprentice an unmanageable horse which then killed 
someone; or unjustly punishing a railway company which had properly examined a train 
before it left the station.   
And this last concern of Wakley’s tapped into a deeper concern: that the arbitrary and 
unpredictable deodand inhibited the increasingly valorised risk-takers in charge of industry. 
(60)  In contrast, the deodand, representing a tool available to the local community for the 
collectivised management of risk, clashed with dominant conceptions of risk as either a 
matter of individual responsibility, dealt with by contract law and thrift, or else something 
to be spread through rational, predictable and institutional mechanisms. (61)    
Support for the principle behind the conjoined Bills was overwhelming; they were approved 
by large majorities in both Houses of Parliament and were supported “by the Lord 
Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, by all the law Lords, and by the Judges of England.” (62)  
The only unease expressed about abolition was raised by Mr S. Wortley MP, who argued 
that despite its problems, the deodand provided “a cheap and ready compensation [for] the 
poor” (63), avoiding expensive and risky legal proceedings.  Additionally, he argued that the 
Bill would not enable claims against a company, but only against a servant “who was in most 
cases a man of straw, and could pay nothing.” (64)  His concerns, immediately dismissed by 
the Attorney General, would prove prescient. 
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Claim for the dependents 
On August 18, 1846, Queen Victoria assented to the abolition of deodands (65).  Eight days 
later, Lord Campbell’s Act came into effect (66), the rule in Baker v. Bolton (67) was 
bypassed and claims for bereaved relatives were instituted.   
The mechanism purportedly gave agency to bereaved families, but was in fact extremely 
limited from their perspective, with workers – legally deemed to have voluntarily taken on 
risk by signing an employment contract – particularly poorly served (68).  Judges 
compensated bereaved families “rarely and begrudgingly” (69) and while there was an 
increase in claims, particularly for railway passengers (70), legal, social and cultural barriers 
prevented many claims from getting as far as a courtroom (71).  S.2 of the Act required 
action by the estate of the deceased, which was impractical for those too poor to proceed 
to probate; and the courts restrictively interpreted the Act to require pecuniary loss, thus 
replacing the uncertainty of the deodand (72) with the vagaries of establishing negligence 
and financial loss.  According to the Mines Inspector in 1853, “However gross may have 
been the neglect which caused the husband’s death, all interests are arrayed against the 
survivors.” (73).  
Thus compensation, based on an increasingly structured assessment of loss, itself shaped by 
documentary evidence generated in a civil action to a specific standard of proof, replaced 
discretionary and flexible financial relief.  At the same time, juries in civil claims were 
warned not to take the opportunity to punish railway companies with large awards against 
them (74) and were instead to focus on the law.  Dependents better able to establish family 
connections or pecuniary loss – those with formally sanctioned relations recognised by the 
law (75) and with licit, certain and evidenced financial affairs – were in a far stronger 
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position than those with less formally recognised intimate relationships or financial affairs 
(76).  The question of financial relief shifted from the inquest arena to the civil courts; from 
a local space, a hearing held in a public house attended by neighbours, into an “extended, 
expensive process” in a formal court room (77).  The dependent family became a key actor; 
plaintiff and later claimant, moving from the periphery of the law into law’s direct gaze, and 
the jury, potentially capricious in the inquest, was shackled in the civil jurisdiction by legal 
technicalities, expertise and evidence.   
In this process, despite being re-engineered as the vehicle of justice, the family revealed 
flaws when opened to the scrutiny of the law.  In particular, legislators expressed concerns 
about leaving the family to manage finances.  A widow, left to herself, as Viscount Sandon 
observed in the House of Commons, might marry another man and “the money might all be 
expended the day after the verdict in a drunken frolic.”(78)  Such families had to be 
controlled; meaning widows, cast either as domestic angels to be protected or fallen 
women to be anxiously managed (79), had to be restrained and the money secured to the 
children. (80)   
In the post-deodand world, the risks for business were made more predictable (81), as new 
technology drove the development of tort law (82).  However, financial relief for the family 
may not have appeared any less arbitrary, and was certainly less immediate.  The family 
were given rights, but with little ability to enforce such rights for all but the richest families, 
and the informal, negotiated and uncertain gave way to the impenetrable, constrained and 
putatively certain.  
From an unruly community to governing through the family 
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As well as a tool for financial relief for the family, the flexibility of the deodand enabled 
financial relief for others – if there was no family, or the family was not formally constituted.  
Alternatively, monies could be put to community benefit – fixing bridges or providing 
financial relief to those with leprosy (83) – or as a negotiation tool to effect health and 
safety improvements (84).  Abolition of the deodand was a way of managing the unruly 
juries who sought to use the deodand in this way, whether with the support of a local 
coroner, or without, as Thomas Wakley discussed with such chagrin in the House of 
Commons.  At the same time, the creation of a right to sue for the bereaved dependents 
was part of a process of formalising the family, and framing them as properly and primarily 
responsible for leading reaction to death.  The abolition of the deodand and the 
implementation of the Fatal Accidents Act were thus central to strategies to manage the 
unpredictability of the community following death.  The next section looks at each in turn. 
Subduing an unruly community 
Prior to abolition, the deodand was available as a tool of resistance for the community, most 
famously in relation to the industrialisation of Britain and the railways.  As discussed above, 
abolition was closely linked to the protection of risk-takers driving the burgeoning rail 
network.  As Wellington dryly notes, “the date of this statute (1846) may suggest the great 
inconvenience which the law, if it had remained in operation, would have caused ... to 
railway and other enterprises in which loss of life is a frequent occurrence.” (85)  
The railways expanded dramatically in the first half of the nineteenth century (86), “a 
mindless juggernaut, grinding private rights into the ground in the blind quest for profit.” 
(87) As deaths at the hands of the juggernaut became a frequent occurrence, some inquest 
juries reacted to defend the private rights of those killed by the railways.  The Mechanic’s 
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Magazine of 1842 cast the railways as “The Modern Mechanical Moloc” and severely 
censured “the railroads for the numerous accidents that had occurred, attributing them to a 
general lack of precaution and scarcity of safety measures.” As a result “Deodand after 
deodand has been imposed by honest and indignant juries – deodands in amount surpassing 
any previously known in our criminal history.” (88)  Case reports bear this activity out, and in 
a number of cases in the late 1830s and early 1840s, juries found trains and carriages to be 
deodands, and valued them at significant amounts.(89)  The Monthly Law Magazine in 1841 
stated that “in 1840 we have seen [deodands] rapidly ascend to £500, £800, and at length, 
£2,000.” (90) Railway companies took such inquests very seriously, “almost always sending 
legal counsel and at least one director” (91) and successfully challenged many deodands 
which were awarded (92).  Railway deaths provided the backdrop to the debates in 
Parliament (93), and Cawthon highlights the ‘behind the scenes’ intervention of the ‘railway 
interest’ – “A combination of outraged lawyers, employers and judges [who] got in the ear 
of Parliament in the matter.” (94)   
Before this lobby succeeded in abolishing the deodand, Smith suggests that the law left 
juries little choice but to declare trains and carriages as high value deodand, as an ancient 
rule that the deodand moved to the death bound them to recognise them as such and it was 
“hard to pretend they were low value.”(95)  This version of events implicitly undermines the 
place of active resistance in the deliberations of these juries, who could have decided on a 
low value (96), or chosen, as in other deodand cases, to separate part of a moving object 
from the whole (97).  Instead some coroners and juries explicitly deployed the deodand as a 
tool to exact concessions, and while this was not common in the early Victorian inquest, it 
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was a vital and potentially progressive development, curtailed by the abolition of the 
deodand. (98)   
Without the ambiguity available in the deodand, the inquest jury lost this tool, and also lost 
the possibility of expressing a formal retributive reaction to deaths deemed to be by 
misadventure.  Furthermore, shifting out of the potentially populist coroner’s court meant 
that arguments over compensation lacked the vital energy which an inquest in close 
physical proximity to the death could generate.  By contrast, after abolition, financial loss 
was principally a dispassionate question for objective determination by the law, and the 
potentially insurrectionary voice of the public was radically diminished. The inquest, the 
“only court in which working class people could participate as jurors” (99) was shorn of a 
tool for the community to exact accountability. 
Governing through the family 
Inquests have long been a site for the maintenance of public order. As part of this, emphasis 
was laid on the community’s role in safety and security. In the 1840s, J. Toulmin Smith 
argued that inquests were a forum for  
“free unofficial men ... to declare for the satisfaction and security of all, whether it 
appears to their plain common sense that the case is free from suspicion. ... The 
object is one of such paramount importance to the safety and security to all men in 
the community, that there has, from the earliest times existed an officer ... whose 
special function it is to preside at these inquiries.” (100) 
The coroner as presiding officer did not constitute the historic jurisdiction of the inquest, 
but rather arranged for it to exist.  The coroner “did not ‘hear and determine,’ but kept 
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records of all that went on in the county and that in any way concerned the administration 
of criminal justice”. (101) 
However, in the period from 1840 to 1926, the development of medical expertise and 
medically qualified coroners, the shift from election to appointment of the coroner, the 
reduction in cases which had to be heard by juries, and the removal of the body from the 
inquest forum, reshaped the place of the community, from agents of that declaration to 
listeners to the declaration.  Public order was increasingly maintained through public 
information, not necessarily through public involvement in any conclusions.  As Burney 
argues  
“At its theoretical core lay the proposition that the public circulation of information 
concerning potentially disturbing deaths was a tool of social stability.  In giving a 
formal context for the airing of the gossip, rumour, and suspicion generated by such 
deaths, the inquest diffused a tension that, if left to fester, might pose a threat to 
the reign of sense and reason.” (102) 
In the maintenance of public order, the emphasis was on the gathering of men, “the doer, 
the creator, the discoverer, the defender” rather than women, “whose intellect is not for 
invention or creation, but for sweet ordering, arrangement and decision,” excluding, 
apparently, legal decision-making (103).  
However women, including the spectre of the drunken widow, also presented a risk to 
public order.  Whilst her husband was alive, the Victorian wife was “By her office, and place 
… protected from all danger and temptation,” (104) but such protection was lost following 
her husband’s death.  Thus the hearing had to engage in protection and restraint of such 
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women, and it was in this context that the dependent family was reconstituted as key 
participants in the inquest; firstly as claimants in a potential civil case, and later with the 
development of formal rights to engage with the inquiry.  Family, rather than community, 
became the essential component in an effective declaration of the cause of death to allay 
suspicion; as junior co-author and principal reactants to the declaration.   
Donzelot describes this transformation of family into the reorganising principle of society as 
“as a positive form of solution to the problems posed by a liberal definition of the state 
rather than as a negative element of resistance to social change.” (105) He analyses the way 
that in this period family became the foundation of the liberal state’s response to pauperism 
and indigence, with philanthropy focussing efforts on the family, encouraging family saving 
and thrift, and making the family “agents for conveying the norms of the state into the 
private sphere.” (106)  As he argues, the strength of family as a mechanism for policing lies 
in the relationship between the imposition of these state norms and the complexity of 
familial configurations; social control is maintained through an interplay between external 
forces and differences of potential within the concept “family”.   
Thus, according to Donzelot, because the family is malleable and ill-defined, continually 
recreated by the interplay of external and internal pressures, it becomes the key tool by 
which social cohesion is maintained. The shift from deodand to compensation claim is an 
illustration of this; a move from networks of solidarity to claims procedures.  The abolition 
of the deodand marked a severing of a key link between the community and the family in 
relation to death.  At the same time, the establishment of a limited civil claim marks out the 
separation of family and a claim to justice distinct from any rights the community might 
have.   
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Furthermore, the family was developed as a mechanism to import key norms, focussing on 
the protection of life within and by the family and interdependence of family members in 
exclusion of their place and links in the community.  The difference of potentials within 
family, and the flexible engagement with that variability was seen in the tool of 
compensation; as noted above, with larger awards for lawfully recognised families which 
managed their finance in formally established ways and could thereby establish dependence 
on each other, whilst less formally constituted families lost out.  Law reinforced the angel in 
the home, and penalised the fallen woman. Through all these means, narratives around 
compensation and explaining the unexplained saw the formal family recast as the basic unit 
of engagement with the state’s relation to death, for which investigations take place, from 
which claims to justice can initiate and must depend, and upon which social control is 
founded.   
Ritual, Symbolism and Materiality 
The abolition of the deodand and creation of the right to claim highlights a final line of 
transformation; that of the place of ritual, symbolism and materiality.  I examine this final 
line in three parts: ritual and the deodand; the abolition of the deodand; and the role of 
materiality. 
Taming Death and the Deodand 
Aries describes the medieval taming of death occurring through humankind’s strategy of 
controlling death by detaching it from the blind violence of nature through ritualization.  He 
argues that a crucial part of this ritualization is the imprisonment of death in public 
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ceremony and spectacle (108).  Key to this was a belief in the advance warning of death; in 
comparison a sudden death was ugly, destroying the natural order of the world. (109) 
Bermann argues that, in such cases, ceremonies were needed to re-establish law.  The 
deodand can be seen as playing a part in this strategy of humankind against nature, a part of 
the ritual of death and a bulwark which re-tamed death, tying it down with a physical object 
and opening it out to public exploration and authentication.  Bermann suggests that the 
declaration of deodand, like trials of objects and animals on the Continent, must be seen as 
part of cultural storytelling, permitting “the community to heal itself after the breach of a 
social norm by creating a narrative whereby a symbolic transgressor of the established 
order was deemed to be "guilty" of a "crime" and cast beyond the boundaries of the 
society." (110)  Thus a declaration that an object is guilty must be taken seriously and its 
symbolic content must be assessed, rather than being dismissed as superstition or error, 
because the legal narrative plays a function in constructing reality.  A narrative founded in 
such proceedings identifies transgressors and removes them from the community, through 
banishment, forfeiture, excommunication, or execution.  This symbolic gesture, founded in 
an essential human need for a managed response to an unexplained event, is a common 
thread in contemporary academic discussion of the deodand (111).   
However, there is a crucial difference between the deodand and trials of animals and guilty 
objects (112).  Unlike in those trials, the potential deodand, be it animal or object, was not 
charged and symbolically put in the dock, and the inquest hearing was not primarily charged 
with deciding its guilt or innocence.  A declaration of deodand did not result in the slaughter 
of an ox that gored, and resulted in a payment by the owner rather than actual forfeiture in 
some cases (113).  Instead of being the defendant in a criminal process, the object or animal 
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was part of the factual nexus that the jury shaped into a narrative explaining death.  It was a 
flexible process, in which a range of potential conclusions could be reached, and objects 
which were nearby when the death occurred could be symbolically brought into the forum, 
declared deodand and valued at the end of the process.  Equally, the jury could reach a 
conclusion on death without finding a deodand.   
While the symbolic importance of the deodand – casting out an object to preserve the 
integrity of the social order – might have similarities to other legal processes involving non-
human actants as in the continental animal trials, the distinction between the two is 
important in analysing the abolition of the deodand and the institution of the family claim.  
Ritual and Abolition  
Some Victorian and contemporary commentators argue that, with its very basis in 
superstition (114), the deodand could not survive modernity (115).  The deodand as an evil 
object could not be reconciled with reason, “which is the soul of law.” (116)  However, this 
account of the irrational deodand underplays the contingent nature of the deodand and its 
abolition.  MacCormack argues that it is not clear that juries were engaged in declaring an 
object to be evil (118), and immediately prior to its abolition, the primary narratives around 
the deodand were of prevention of death and compensation of the bereaved.  Adaptation 
of the deodand was not impossible.  It could, as Smith has argued was happening, have 
been remodelled into compensation for the family (119).  Additionally, adopting the 
justifications of Hale and others, modification of the deodand could have increasingly 
focussed on the deodand in a narrative of prevention of death (120).  Such a shift could 
have maintained but subdued the symbolism of the banishment of the object; allowing the 
ambiguity of the deodand to continue to reflect different concerns.   
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Having criticised the irrational deodand, one Victorian commentator proposed exactly such 
an adaptation in the Monthly Law Magazine of 1841:  
“When we consider how often the death of a husband and a father plunges the wife 
and children in a state of extreme destitution, how frequently a whole family is thus 
by one blow deprived of the very means of existence, we must surely lament that it 
is not left to the discretion of the inquest to deduct a certain portion of the deodand 
for the relief of the sufferers.  Thus the same means which have been adopted to 
instil a horror of inflicting death, might also tend to the support and nourishment of 
life.”(121) 
This proposal was not acted upon.  Crucially, this was not because the deodand as an object 
which caused death was no longer sustainable.  The deodand was never solely such an 
object, but was instead a flexible community tool which could meet various ends. It was this 
very freedom and flexibility which could not be tolerated; as a jury could not be relied upon 
to be objective and rational.   
Once the deodand was abolished, the powerful demands of symbolic justice required that 
the inquest did not lose the aspect of excommunication, and the reworked public health 
inquest, gradually shorn of its criminal jurisdiction, found this in the responsibility to banish 
systems, structures or processes which had caused death, in order to prevent future death 
(122).  Importantly, for reasons of complexity and expertise, these were not questions which 
could be left to the jury and had to be dealt with by the coroner.  Symbolic justice could 
therefore be married with reason, at the cost of the exclusion of the irrational jury.  The 
deodand, not necessarily associated with evil before its demise, is now regularly cast as the 
evil object, because it was abolished in the name of rationality.  However, rather than the 
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deodand itself, it was the jury’s freedom to name objects deodand which offended reason, 
and the deodand was made the blameless victim of the triumph over reason over evil.  In 
this triumph, symbolised in the coroner’s reports to avoid future deaths, one crucial aspect 
of the previous legal regime was lost: the deodand as physical object. 
The loss of materiality 
At one level, the deodand was an object made by the jury.  It was given substance, 
independent form and value by their declaration, as wheels were separated from carts, and 
individual steps from staircases.  At another level, it pre-existed the declaration as an object 
which the deceased was near in the moments before their death; a cask they were carrying, 
a vat of ale they fell into, a boat they fell out of, a ladder they climbed up.  It might have 
been classed as a thing which moved due to a deliberate act – a horse which bolted – or an 
object which could not reasonably have any intention attached to it – a pebble on which 
they tripped. 
All of these things act (123).  They intervene, make a difference, and make things happen.  
They are actors both because they pre-exist and because they are named as actors by the 
jury, and these cannot be separated.  A deodand cannot be intangible, untouchable, but it 
also cannot be called into being as a deodand unless the jury names it so.  Once called into 
being, it acts backwards, as a cause, occasion or instrument of death, and forwards, as 
explanation, punishment, deterrent and relief. 
Abolishing the object as an actant can be seen as part of a wider trend in which causation 
shifted from Aristotelean to Newtonian understandings of the subservient nature of things.  
Bennett argues that this conception, the “image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized 
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matter, feeds human hubris and our earth destroying fantasies of conquest and 
consumption.”(124)  She calls for recognition of the vibrant nature of materials; not by 
positing a force that can enter and animate a physical body, but rather by exploring the 
affective nature of non-human bodies.  A modern focus on a division of object and actor 
binds material into “passive, mechanistic, or divinely infused substance” (125) while 
removing this division allows a refocusing on the catalyzing capacity of non-human actants 
and their affective potential.  Lemke, drawing on Barad as well as Braun & Whatmore, 
argues that this approach is too all-encompassing and fails sufficiently to recognise the 
importance of a relational perspective, and the conditions in the specific moment in which 
non-human actants have vitality (126).   
These insights are demonstrated in the deodand; both in the way the deodand is founded in 
the specific relative conditions of the moment of its creation, and the affective potential of 
each deodand.  The abolition of the deodand meant that recognition of this affective 
capacity was lost to inquest law.  The deodand had acted to give power to the forum, the 
community, as explored above, and this was denied after 1846.  Crucially, it also had an 
affective place for the family.  In granting the deodand to the bereaved, the very material of 
death was being tied into the outcome of the inquest.  The family, in receiving the 
parachute that did not open, was put in immediate proximity to the deceased and the end 
of their existence.  Where a family received the value of the contents of the barrel which 
had crushed one of their number, that money was directly linked to that cask; it was 
representative of that cask and maintained the immediacy of the link to death.  The material 
was thereby affective in a way which transcended a formulation of it as an instrument of 
another human.  It also could not be said to be wholly an instrument of the jury, as while 
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they had a broad discretion to attribute value, they were bound by what was available to be 
a deodand – a house twenty miles away from the death could not be deodand – and if they 
could compensate without the deodand, such compensation would not intervene in the 
narrative of death in the same way.  The deodand’s affective value was therefore 
axiomatically fused with the conditions of the historically specific moment it was created; 
stretching from the physical site and moment of death, to the politics of the inquest hearing 
which shaped the narrative of that death.   
Its combined physicality and contingency also permitted it to embody risk.  Until its 
abolition, the deodand marked a world in which peril and possibility lay everywhere and in 
everything.  In binding those risks into physical form, it made them directly available to the 
community, and provided both demarcation for the generation of a narrative and a vessel to 
contain the ubiquitous risk.  It embodied the local community’s response to the danger of 
death, charging them with a responsibility to engage with the physical world’s capacity for 
unruliness, and materialising the joining of law and that world.  Aries describes the medieval 
resignation to suffering and death, and acceptance of the constant presence of evil, not as 
submission to nature or biological necessity, but “as recognition of an evil inseparable from 
man.” (127)  Similarly, the deodand had acted as recognition of – not submission to – the 
inseparable place of the uncontrollable physical world in law.  It characterised an 
embracement of the generative nature of law’s relationship with the material world, and 
brought the contingency of the physical world into the heart of law. 
Abolition meant the separation of the inseparable, and the abrupt termination of the 
possibility of the deodand acting beyond human agency whilst being inextricably merged 
with human agency.  This was lost to law; reinforcing a change of perspective towards the 
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natural world as lifeless instrument or unthinking beast; static, pending the call of 
humanity’s will to act and control.  The shifting possibilities once held out by Marvell’s 
Nymph were excluded, and the place of matter was refashioned as thoroughly inert, 
beneath law’s gaze and without affective potential. 
Separated from contingent matter, law proceeded to make a bold promise: that it could 
characterise, contain and restrain risk.  Appearing to give agency to the bereaved family – 
the apparent chief beneficiaries and subjects of the Act – law promised to provide certainty, 
predictability and control.  Through Lord Campbell’s Act, law identified legitimate risks, and 
promised to reduce them; not only from the risk of poverty for a bereaved family, but also 
the risk of arbitrary removal of property and the reduction of risky behaviour, as a claim 
against careless companies would “read such companies a proper lesson.” (128)  Law’s 
promise was prospective, providing certainty in the face of such risks, through the 
imposition of apparently objectively justifiable factors; negligence, loss, evidenced family 
link. (129)   
Thus while the deodand had dealt with risk through incorporating and materialising it 
piecemeal, passing possession of it to the community, the law sought to settle risk in 
advance, sharing it out according to political rationalities.  This meant, as far as possible, 
individuals owning their own risk, determined by contracts of employment or insurance, or 
else risks being spread by formal institutional means.  The effect was that law’s promise to 
the bereaved family was a fallacy, as the individualisation and spreading of risk either thrust 
risk upon them, or passed determination of fault and need to more centralised and more 
inaccessible authorities.  The reframing of the relationship of risk and law reassembled 
death and the family as legal subjects constituted by knowable relevant factors, stripping 
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away identity (130), asserting law’s comprehensive reach and denying the authority of 
anything outside law’s purview.   
Such a perspective disabled law’s ability to embrace potentially undisciplinable material and 
to respond to the elemental disorder of sudden death.  The control on offer was thus 
illusory for law’s subjects, as despite law’s promises and efforts to evade, the material and 
uncontrollable refused to be rationalised away.  Where the material of the deodand had 
sustained networks of solidarity, maintaining affective links between law, the community, 
the family and the deceased, the loss of the deodand broke those links, separating family off 
and subjecting them to the disciplinary process of claiming. (133) 
Conclusion 
The deodand appears at the end of the historical inquest, at the conclusion of a particular 
inquest and the point where the record ends.  The deodand appears at the last, only to 
disappear, and it is this very liminality which means that an analysis of the deodand is not 
limited to a discussion of the inquest but can produce an account which drives directly at 
legal personhood and the foundations of the modern state. Its value to the scholar is in its 
ambiguity, grounded in the dualism of its thing-ness and its essential lack of clarity.  The fact 
that it can never be pulled away from the contingent moment of its creation highlights the 
role it played in bringing physicality and contingency to law, and in giving authority to the 
community.  The circumstances of its abolition and the development of a civil claim are 
similarly illuminating; as law promises to structure and make certain, and family is reshaped 
as a vital tool of governance; constrained and directed.   
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Law’s role is not limited to restraint and subjection in this account.  The deodand holds out 
an alternative formulation, absorbed in an object made powerful by legal tradition, ancient 
precedent, and within a particular imaginary of the common law.  The deodand could be 
unjust, but it could also be productive of a form of convivial, local accountability (132), 
founded in the contingent moment and engaging in a productive relationship between law 
and the material world.  Its replacement promised to correct its flaws, but in the futile 
search for clarity and legitimacy, law deliberately took a step away from the richness of 
contingency and materiality.  It was a step too far. Law fell, breaking a vital part of its body, 
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